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Cybernetics, semiotics and meaning 
in the cinema 
Keyan G Tomaselli 
THIS paper builds on Gene Youngblood's 
use of cybernetic theory in film analysis. II 
combines the cybernetic method with 
Peircian-derived semiotics in an attempt to 
derive a meta-theory of social process and 
film textual structure. An attempt is made to 
resolve the more deterministic elements of 
Youngblood's theory, developing a more 
probabilistic approach. The paper ends 
with some conjecture on how the cyber-
semiotic theory developed can be com-
bined with Lacanian psychoanalysis and 
Marxist approaches developed by the scho-
lars contributing to the British journal 
Screen. 
The study of film texts since the first publication 
in English of Christian Metz's (1974a, 1974b) 
seminal works almost a decade ago has largely 
been couched within a broad semiological 
framework. More recent analysis has tended to 
move in the direction of psychoanalysis (Metz, 
1982; Heath, 1981) while a major school rep-
resented by the British journal, Screen, attemp-
ted to exploit the theoretical space created by 
Louis Althusser (1969, 1970) for a fusion of 
Marxism and Lacanian psychoanalysis 
(Screen, ±1974ff;Coward, 1976; Heath, 1981; 
Lovell, 1980; Kuhn, 1982). While this meta-
theoretical Marxist-psychoanaly1ical proble-
matic has come under fire from not a few critics 
(see, eg., McDonnell and Robins, 1980), Alt-
husser's influence on cinema studies in 
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Europe, Britain and America has been undeni-
able, whether from a purely ideological per-
spective or from the more complex position of 
psychoanalysis. 
It is not the intention of this paper to pursue 
the Marxist-psychoanaly1ical strand here, but 
merely to signpost it for it does have relevance 
for the present discussion. This paper investi-
gates a different, largely under-theorised 
strand of film theory which seeks to marry cy-
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bernetics and semiotics. Although some work 
has been done in the field of a film cybernetics 
(Youngblood, 1970; Tomaselli, 1977), it re-
mains for the cybernetic-semiotic connection to 
be made. It is hoped that the present analysis 
will in turn reveal a theoretical space for the 
injection of psychoanalytical postulates. 
Since a previous article has already outlined 
the generic differences and enunciation of the 
respective disciplines of semiology and semio-
tics (Tomaselli, 1981 a), the presentexploration 
will begin with a discussion of a cybernetic ap-
plication to film studies. What follows is an at-
tempt to chart new theoretical territory and to 
provide a conceptual framework for a less for-
malistic and more complex social analysis than 
is evidenced in previous attempts which em-
ploy cybernetics. 
Cybernetics: The control of communi-
cation 
Whereas semiotics deals with the signs and 
codes of messages, cybernetics is concerned 
with the control and flow of communication en-
coded in messages. Control is defined as in-
tervention which restricts deviations from sys-
tem objectives to within pre-defined limits. A 
system is a set of inter-connected parts, each 
part a system in itself, each system contained 
within a larger system. In a cybernetic system 
control is effected by means of a feedback loop 
where the output of a system is linked to its 
input in such a way that variations in. output 
from a pre-established nonm results in compen-
satory behaviour that restores system output to 
that norm. Control on the basis of actual per-
formance' rather than expected perfonmance, 
is known as error-controlled regulation or feed-
back, and is indicated by sensory mechanisms 
which measure perfonmance. 
The system's actual performance is com-
pared with its intended performance. Informa-
tion is then returned to the decision-making 
point, so that inputs can be modified to correct 
the system output to within the limits set. Infor-
mation is communicated by signalling systems. 
A signal differs from a sign in terms of both func-
tion and purpose. On the one hand a Signal 
could be a physical electrical impulse which has 
no semiotic purpose. In this role, the signal is 
studied by information theory and has little rele-
vance for the present discussion. At another 
level of analysis a signal is a pertinent unit of a 
system that may be an expression ordered to a 
content. When used as the recognised antece-
dent of a foreseen consequent it may be de-
fined as a sign, in as much as it stands for its 
consequent as far as the sender is concerned 
(Eco, 1976:48). In order to understand this 
more clearly, we shall have to consider the 
notion of bit and hubit. 
Shannon's (1948) contribution to the study of 
communication was the establishment of a uni-
versal model of communication systems. The 
elements of his model consist of an information 
source, a transmitter, a communication chan-
nel, a noise source which is an unpredictable 
interfering signal that alters or mutilates the 
desired signal, a receiver and a message desti-
nation. These six elements constitute the basis 
of any communication system, no matter how 
complex. Shannon was able to quantify both 
the information rate of the message source (a 
speaker, output of a television camera, a per-
son writing) and the capacity of communication 
channels by introducing a measuring unit called 
a bit. This term, derived from 'binary digit', is a 
unit of uncertainty or choice; the undertainty 
between 'yes' or 'no' when both are equally 
likely, or the choice a person exercises in se-
lecting unpredictably 'left' or 'right'. The num-
bers 0 and 1 can specify yes or no, right or left. 
The bits per message or bits per second estab-
lish a measure of the complexity of the mes-
sage sources and the capability of the channel. 
Telephone wire (speech), for example, has a 
capacity of 60 000 bits per second, FM radio 
250 000, and commercial TV, 90 million 
(Peirce, 1972:33). In this physical transmis-
Sion, the signal has no power to signify, al-
though there is a passage of information. 
Where the destination is a human being, a pro-
cess of signification occurs. It is not axiomatic 
that the source of the transmitter be human, 
on Iy that the system incorporates a system of 
rules known by the addressee, and provided 
that the signal is not merely a stimulus but has a 
capacity to arouse an interpretive response. 
This process is made possible through the ex-
istence of a code and can be theoretically 
measured in terms of hubits which account for 
the quantity and variety of infonmation bits re-
ceived per hour, multiplied by the number of 
man,hours devoted to their reception. Accord-
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ing to Webber (1967:121) who enunciated the 
the term, a hubit is a measure of social account-
ing and represents a basis for the computation 
of the cultural value of information receipts. 
Hubits measure potential information available 
in a message and are therefore an index of the 
system's performance. Whether all the infor-
mation is utilised by the receiver or not, is not, 
however, measured by hubits, but is accounted 
for by Peirce's notion of interpretants. A survey 
of television performances of Macbeth (or 
Anna) for example, would show that Macbeth 
transmits more content per minute than does 
Colombo. Successive episodes of Colombo 
become highly redundant, whereas repeated 
viewing of Macbeth would continue to reveal 
content that was not previously absorbed. Thus 
a signal (measured in bits) is communicative 
and informative (measured in hubits) if it ex-
pands the receiver's awareness or introduces 
him/her to something new. Whereas communi-
cation means 'meaningful for the sender', in-
formative denotes 'meaningful forthereceiver'. 
If the signal divulges to the recipient something 
he already knows, or conveys nothing, it is un-
informative. 
A cybernetic system monitors and controls 
the flow of information by means of a sensory 
mechanism which continuously assesses per-
formance. This device must have the capacity 
to anticipate and measure disturbances which 
may arise from the system's environment. The 
decision-making apparatus will specify action 
which will effectively deal with the disturbances 
to keep .the system viable and enable it to pro-
duce an output which coincides as closely as 
possible with the norm. The variety in the de-
cision-making device must be at least equal to 
that of the disturbances. This mechanism con-
trols the natural tendency of closed systems to 
deteriorate (according to the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics) and become disordered (or 
entropic, that is, lacking new information) by 
adjusting the system's parts to within narrow, 
pre-established limits or thresholds. 
According to Eco (1976:42), information is a 
measure of the freedom of choice and is the 
probability of an event occurring within an equi-
probable system. The probability is the ratio 
between the number of cases that tum out to be 
realised and the total number of possible cases. 
The relationship between a series of events 
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and the series of possibilities connected to it is 
the relationship between an arithmetical pro-
gression and a geometrical one, the latter rep-
resenting the binary opposition of the former. 
Thus, given an event to be realised among n 
different probabilities of realization, the amount 
of information represented by the occurrence of 
that event, once it has been selected, is given 
by: 
log n =x 
In order to isolate that event, x binary choices 
are necessary and the realization of the event is 
worth x bits of information. This formula does 
not identify information with content but rather 
with the universe of alternatives required to de-
fine the occurrence without ambiguity (Eco, 
1976:42). In this sense, infomnation is the value 
of equi-probability among an array of combina-
tional possibilities, a value which increases 
along with the number of possible choices: the 
greater the number of equi-probable events, the 
more highly informative is the system. Since 
information measures the equi-probability of a 
uniform statistical distribution at the source, in-
formation is directly proportional to the entropy 
of a system (Shannon and Weaver, 1949), 
since the entropy of a system is the state of 
equi-probability to which its elements tend 
(Eco, 1976:42). That is, information may be 
defined as being inversely proportional to en-
tropy, or negentropic. 
In order to transmit this information in a 
finished message form, a reductionist argu-
ment must be applied 10 generate a new type 01 
source imbued with particular informational 
properties which may be subject to a semiotic 
analysis. This is done by imposing upon an 
equi-probable event of a system of constraints 
which specify the possiblity of certain combina-
tions over alternatives. As the universe of origi-
nal information diminishes, the possiblity of 
transmitting unambiguous messages in-
creases (Eeo, 1976:44). 
The following fonmula offered by Shannon 
(1949) accounts for information I which implies 
N choices among h symbois: 
1= Nlog2h 
Messages can be formed and transmitted by 
reducing the values of Nand h. This results in 
the transmission of a message which provides 
information about a system of elements whose 
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rules. The fewer the alternatives, the easier the 
communication and the more probable the 
message. This reduction in choice in terms of 
the notion of equivalence (the selection of 
paradigmatic elements) restricts the universe 
of selection and combination thereby limiting 
and possibly even excluding the process of art 
which is, by definition, highly informative, low in 
probability and negentropic. Entropy, then, not 
only measures the disorder of a system, but 
also the lack of information about the structure 
of the system. An adequately informed system 
generates sufficient energy to facilitate change 
and assert progress. Energy is defined as "the 
capacity to re-arrange elemental order" 
(Youngblood, 1970:63) and runs counter to 
entropy which has no such capacity as no new 
information is returned through the input chan-
nels. The amount of energy generated is di-
rectly proportional to the quantity of information 
available about the system. Norbert Wiener, 
the originator of cybernetics, explains how the 
concept of entropy can be expanded to include 
human communication: 
... it is possible to treat sets of messages as 
having an entropy -like sets of states of the 
external world ... the information carried by a 
set of messages is a measure of organiza-
tion. In fact, it is possible to interpret the 
messages as essentially the negative of its 
entropy ... (Wiener, 1954:21). 
The less anticipated the message, the more 
information it gives. Choice is thus a cofldition 
of meaningfulness or hubit potential. If the sen-
der is constrained to one path of behaviour or 
response and unable to choose between alter-
natives, nothing will be transmitted. 
Entropy, cinema and video 
Film, art and entertainment constitute a cyber-
netic system in the following terms: structure of 
the system, measured in hubits and which is an 
index of the performance which may be ex-
pected from it refers to the 'human condition', 
The latter is precisely defined in terms of the 
variety and amount of information received and 
decoded by an individual or society, The de-
gree of perception of incoming information 
measures the state of the human condition, It 
will be remembered that the amount of informa-
tion is directly proportional to the degree of 
available choice. Where choice is limited, infor-
mation is restricted and the individual's percep-
tion is constrained within the limits set by the 
system. Entropy refers to the degree of human-
kind's ignorance about its condition. Ignorance 
is a state of increasing chaos (or entropy) due to 
misinformation or lack of information about the 
structure of the system. Plot, story, genre, 
drama and convention are the decision-making 
and control devices which restrict choice, and 
thereby information, and enable the commer-
cial entertainer to adjust the inputs (signs or-
dered to a content) and so manipulate the out-
put (information) in terms of pre-conditioned 
audience needs. The potential for manipulation 
depends on the receiver's recognition of the 
sender's communicative intention and upon his 
making an appropriate behavioural response to 
it. 
The purpose of a cybernetic-semiotic analy-
sis in this context is to determine what inputs 
(formulas, genres, conventions and codes) are 
required to achieve pre-determined outputs 
(profit, understanding or ideological effect) gi-
ven a set of goals. Three basic processes are at 
work here - homeostasis, evolutionary and 
revolutionary change - and will be developed 
in more detail than is evident in previous work 
(see Tomaselli, 1977:9-15; Youngblood, 1970). 
Homeostasis: The Basis of the Genre Film 
Homeostasis involves repetitive action which 
eliminates deviation through negative feed-
back, thus maintaining the system as it is. 11 is a 
self-adapting closed system which suppresses 
change in both the system and the code struc-
ture. Such information systems maintain a 
stable level of organization and begin to degen-
erate unless new information communicated by 
new signs and codes is fed in to counteract 
disturbances. When and if change does occur, 
it follows a chain-like pattern and is impercepti-
bly slow. Some scholars who misunderstand 
the nautre of art unwittingly restrict their inter-
pretations to this phenomenologically derived, 
superficial category. 
Stephenson and Debrix (1970:.17), for exam-
pie, define art as follows: 
.. , art is a process in which the artist makes 
use of his experience, intuition or inspiration, 
selecting and arranging it to create beautiful 






















































lesser extent imitate reality and through 
these objects he communicates his experi-
ence to an audience. 
Three issues of cybernetic-serniotic import-
ance concern us here. 
a) " ... beautiful and true ... " suggest a static 
interpretation at the level of appearances. The 
aesthetic code is neither extended nor broken 
and the signs remain highly motivated and 
iconic. Such signs, according to Peirce (See 
Hartshorne and Weiss, 1931-35; 1958) are de-
generate for their relationship with the signified 
is independent of any cognitive act. These 
signs have no external rneaning or immediate 
object, since iconic signs do not represent any-
thing. Ifthey did there would be a way of signify-
ing their objects beyond merely resembling 
them (Peirce, 8.119 in Hartshorne and Weiss, 
1931-35)*. The effect produced in the interpre-
ter of "beautiful and true" signs corresponds to 
Peirce's concept of the immediate interpretant 
which simply reveals correct understanding of 
the sign itself (Fig. 1). It does not produce a 
reaction in the interpreter since it satisfies the 
conditioned expectations of the audience 
whose interpretation is controlled by the feed-
back or memory of past perforrnance. In cyber-
netic terms, if art communicates the human 
condition, and this condition is not necessarily 
beautiful or conform to the prevailing percep-
tion of reality, the negative feedback will elimi-
nate such unwanted information. 
(b) " ... imitate reality ... " Imitation is the result 
of inadequate information and is informed by 
degenerate iconic signs. It is repetitive and 
stable and such 'art' makes no attempt to reas-
sess or extend hurnan experience or to expand 
choice or develop new signs and syntagmatic 
combinations (and paradigmatic selection) to 
identify relationships where none were seen 
before. The conceptual design of this type of 
message restricts the quantity and variety of 
information available from it. Consequently, no 
new information is returned via the feedback 
loop. Signs rernain highly codified and conven-
tional and are in constant danger of lapsing into 
cliche. No cognisance is taken of outside dis-
turbances and no change in system behaviour 
results. The systern, both the structure and its 
codes which give its information form in terms 
of content, is unable to develop or match the 
variety of the disturbances which may occur. 
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(c) The definition offered by Stephenson and 
Debrix excludes rnany films or works of art 
which occur outside of "imitated reality", or 
what Peirce (8.184) calls the final interpretant 
which accounts for that "which would finally be 
decided to be the true representation if consid-
eration of the matter were carried so far that an 
ultirnate opinion would be reached". An image 
is not necessarily inexorably tied to antecedent 
reality. Artists can create a different kind of 
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And So On .•. 
Tomaselli, 1981.: 47 
reality by a richer application of the trichotomy 
of signs in relation to their interpretants. The 
'reality' created stands autonornously as a rival 
codified totality to the "imitated reality" or the 
physical nature of the 'real world'. To imitate 
reality even through the artist's "use of his ex-
perience, intuition or inspiration" is to deny the 
coherence of the reality within the mind of the 
artist, the objective nature of ideology and ig-
nores the capacity of icons to act as sign-
vehicles or to acknowledge Peirce's irreducible 
triadic relative where the sign determines the 
interpretant (the idea to which the sign gives 
* Further references will refer to Peirce and the paragraph number 
in Hartshome and Weiss. 
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rise). Signification is therefore restricted to first 
order iconic self-contained signs and little po-
tential exists for the full use of second and third 
order signs. Imitation further confines the pro-
cess of unlimited semiosis through which signi-
fication continually shifts by referring signs 
back to other signs where the interpretant 
which initially determines something else be-
comes itself a sign, and so on ad infinitum. This 
disturbing influence is therefore eliminated 
from the communication (or 'art') process. 
However, the nature of the disturbances which 
may impinge on the system may cause it to 
decay at a greater rate than it can reconstitute 
itself. For example, it became evident that the 
silent film of the Soviet montage directors had 
evolved toward a dead end, its capacity for 
adaption and mutation restricted through its 
stubborn adherence to over-specialised codes 
and an inability to cope with a new disturbance 
(a different kind of code), that of sound. 
Youngblood (1970) argues that commercial 
entertainment is non-creative, destroys the au-
dience's ability to appreciate and participate in 
the creative process and works against art 
since it is a closed system where the feedback 
process is dominated by a lack of new informa-
tion. A frequently used sign, for example, be-
comes conventionalised and the probability 
that it will be decoded similarly by different re-
ceivers is increased exponentially. Metz 
(1974a) shows how the white hat gradually be-
came codified into the signifier of the 'good' 
cowboy, but then became a cliche and lost its 
power. This process is caused by the over-use 
of a sign. The signifier becomes drained of 
meaning. In cybernetic terms, the error-con-
trolled regulation or feedback signal contains 
information which is highly repetitive and highly 
probable. In other words, the signs and codes 
which give the in/onnation a content have a low 
value of equi-probability. In terms of entertain-
ment, to satisty the profit motive the commercial 
entertainer has to give the audience what it 
expects which is conditional upon what this au-
dience previously received. The fatuous argu-
ments of movie executives that they are merely 
pandering to public taste has encapsulated 
them in an incestuous homeostatic argument 
which confuses cause with effect and which 
obscures economic and ideological determin-
ants altogether. This attitude is epitomised in 
the viewpoint of Adolf Zukor, one of the found-
ers of Paramount Pictures who tailored his 
company's productions to the conviction that 
"The public is never wrong" (Fadiman, 1972: 
12). That commercial survival is dependent 
upon homeostatic formulas and the correct in-
terpretation of the immediate interpretant only 
is further substantiated by Leo Rosten's ana-
lysis of Hollywood: 
The very success of Hollywood lies in the 
skill with which it reflects the assumptions, 
fallacies, and the aspirations of an entire 
·culture. The movie producers, the movie di-
rectors, the movie writers and the movie ac-
tors work with stereotypes which are current 
in our society ... (they) reinforce our typolo-
gies on an enormous scale with overpower-
ing repetitiveness. Whether the movies imi-
tate life or whether life imitates the movies is 
for others to decide ... Some critics say that 
audiences complain about the movies be-
cause they do not reflect reality; it is this 
writer's suspicion that more people lament 
the fact that reality does not reflect the 
movies (Rosten, 1941). 
This reiteration and imitation which is delib-
erately encoded into the genre film, can, ac-
cording to Youngblood (1970:64), be compared 
to a level of probability: "The content of west-
erns, gangster movies, romances etc., is prob-
able in that it can be identified and com-
prehended simply by classification". In other 
words, probability (or equi-probability) is intrin-
sic to a definition of the term 'genre'. Genre 
movies are only rarely disturbing, innovative or 
openly deviant. The accepted set of conven-
tional genre parameters constrain movies to-
wards a norm and thereby detennine their level 
of probability. Audiences prefer to pre-monitor 
levels of probability because genres fulfill a st-
able function. Tudor (1974:180-182) argues 
that genres are a relatively fixed culture pattern 
which define the moral and social word as well 
as the physical and historical environment. The 
genre movie, by its familiarity, inclines towards 
reassurance. This involves a feedforward rela-
tionship where alternatives are acted out before 
they occur. For example, appropriate music 
superimposed on a two shot of a man and a 
woman pre-supposes alove scene even before 
they act out love-type gestures. Feedforward is 
a method of controlling a system by inserting 
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into it the expectations of future performance in 
terms of its past performance where choice, 
and hence change, is prevented, 
It will be remembered that plot, story and 
drama are control devices by which the enter-
tainer manipulates the audience, Youngblood 
(1970:64) argues that the phenomenon of 
drama is the most universal and archetypal of 
all the genres, Drama deals with a progression 
of events which create suspense, Suspense is 
dependent upon a range of known alternatives 
which create expectation in the mind of the 
viewer. Expectation measures a level of proba-
bility for one cannot expect the unknown. 
Where information is both expected and pro-
bable, the transmission signal is low in equi-
probable value. Expectancy is dependent upon 
prior knowledge and is determined by the rela-
tive frequency with which the viewer has de-
coded such signals in the past. In other words, 
one of the components of an equi-probable 
system rnay be defined in terms of the know-
ledge that the spectator has gained from seeing 
other genre movies. Drama, suspense and ex-
pectation therefore are measurable probabili-
ties and as such are non-informative since 
there is no feedback which is the precondition 
of negentropy. That is, the greater the signal's 
probability of occurrence, the less the infomna-
tion it contains. Where the incidence of a parti-
cular signal is totally predictable and carries no 
signal information it has a probability of 1 (one). 
The sign which transforms the bit information 
into hubits is demotivated through repetition 
while the arbitrary, conventional dimens.ion in-
creases. The weaker the motivation, the more 
determining is the convention. Convention, 
therefore, contributes to a genre's probability 
level. 
Drama in film works through plot and its nar-
rative codes and through the process of signifi-
cation forces the viewer to make culturally and 
ideologically pre-conditioned observations 
about the film being watched. The plot restricts 
the free paradigmatic association of ideas and 
constrains the choice of syntagmatic combina-
tions to within acceptable limits. This in turn 
cybernetically controls the art-process of 
equivalence and forces it to stay within set 
limits. This low value of equi-probable infomna-
tion ensures a passive audience which is hos-
tile to thematic, structural or semiotic innova-
54 
tion. This 'I am here to be entertained' attitude 
effectively cuts off the feedback process, the 
channel along which negentropy must flow if it 
is to be effective. Feedback is a method of 
controlling a system by inserting into it the re-
sults of its past performance (Wiener, 1954: 13). 
Where no feedback occurs no learning results, 
or conversely, in Wiener's words, " ... if the in-
formation which proceeds backward from the 
performance is to change the general method 
and pattern of performance, we have a process 
which may well be called learning". Where the 
viewer or interpreter has learned something 
new or discovered a new dimension to an old 
reality, he or she has benefitted from negative 
feedback. Where the receiver learns nothing 
new, information is redundant (or low in equi-
probability), entropic and solely dependent on 
reassurance of past experience, past perfor-
mance and the conventional interpretation of 
signs and codes at the level of the immediate 
interpretant. 
The genre, as a system of low equi-proba-
bility, is a synchronic closed system which can 
be frozen in one moment of time and revived in 
such a way as to obtain a total description of its 
operation and internal relationships. These can 
in turn be analysed in terms of audience re-
sponse, that is, what changes in the system (Le. 
the filrn-audience-society system) cause 
changes of the system (Le. the genre, its proba-
bility level and its semiotic components which 
are ordered to a content). 
Opposed to change, the entertainer who is 
only a craftsman, tries not to alienate his audi-
ence by employing a new language (ie. 
changes in the system) even if he were capable 
of it. The entertainment system is therefore a 
closed system where entropy dominates the 
feedback process. As Boultenhouse (1967:35) 
observes: 
The Hollywood director is usually surprised 
to discover that his art has been taken seri-
ously ... (He) is a craftsman using all his skills 
to protect an investment by making· as much 
profit as possible. If his skills are repeated 
and developed to the pcint where they can 
be identified, this does not make him an ar-· 
tist. 
Even directors who have set out with an ar-
tistic intention have fallen prey to the Second 
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Law of Thermodynamics which have restricted 
the choices allowed in an equi-probable sys-
tem. A pertinent example is Alfred Hitchcock's 
(1966:61) statements: 
In recent years ... I have become more com-
mercially minded, afraid that anything at all 
subtle may be missed. I have learned from 
experience how easily small touches are 
overlooked ... the art of directing is to know 
just how far you can go. 
The information contained in such systems of 
significance tend to be static, repetitive and 
stable. The internal systemic workings of the 
genre are entrenched, repeated and refined, 
often to the point of cliche. 
Evolutionary Change: The Outer Limits of the 
Genre 
The signification systems employed by some 
directors even within the rules of the genre are 
open to change and may transcend, to a small 
but noticeable extent, pre-established conven-
tion and rules. This process has a capacity for 
self-transformation into new and different 
styles and semiotic components through intro-
ducing a variety which pem1its constructive 
change. This evolutionary growth extends be-
yond the meaning of the sign as embodied in 
the immediate interpretant and is mediated 
through the dynamical interpretant which is the 
" ... actual effect which the Sign as a Sign really 
determines" (Peirce, 4.536); that is, the direct 
effect actualiy produced by the sign upon an 
interpreter of it. Signs at this level of organiza-
tion produce new interpretants, new represen-
tations which refer to the same object. Such 
signs can be indexical and operate at the sec-
ond and third orders of signification. They are 
able to move beyond a merely iconic represen-
tation from the dynamical object to the imme-
diate and from denotation to connotation. This 
occurs through the process of unlimited 
semiosis where in order to establish what the 
inlerpretant of a sign is, it is necessary to name 
it by means of another sign, and so on. Fiske 
and Hartley (1978:59-60) discuss the idea of 
semiotic growth in the following manner: 
Most codes are dynamic systems, continu-
ally evolving to meet the changing needs 
and practices of their users. The English 
language, our most sophisticated code, is 
constantly evolving. New words are added 
(paradigmatic change) as are new conven-
tions and rules by which we combine them 
(syntagmatic change). So in any dynamic or 
evolving code, there is a constant tension 
between tradition and innovation or between 
convention and originality. 
Dynamical interpretants are of three kinds: 
emotional, energetic, and logical. (see Peirce, 
5.475). This sub-division derives from the fact 
that a sign can leave the interpreter with a mere 
feeling or it can perfom1 an external or internal 
action. The emotional interpretant accounts for 
the feeling produced by the sign and can range 
from the first feeling of comprehension of ling-
uistic or semiotic signs to the apprehensive 
emotion that is generated by viewing a Hitch-
cock movie. In the latter case, the emotional 
interpretant is normally the only effect of a sign, 
although in terms of negentropy Hitchcock 
·(1966:61) can say, 'I am freer now to do what I 
want than I was just a few years ago". I n other 
words, where a director encodes a sign with 
extra information, there will occur a further in-
terpretant mediated via the emotional interpre-
tant. This second dynamical interpretant, the 
energetic, involves an inner mental effort. It is 
not concerned with the meaning of an intel-
lectual concept but rather with single acts like 
the filming or editing of a scene. Physical action 
is not necessary, an act of imagination is suffi-
cient effort to bring the energetic interpretant 
into play. This explains the process that allows 
Hitchcock to state that he is "freer" now than he 
was in the past. It also explains why films which 
seem incomprehensible on first release are un-
derstood better some years afterwards by the 
same audiences who have, in the interim, 
benefitted from the regenerative negative and 
cumulative feedback. This implies also that the 
interpreter has advanced beyond the quality of 
impression produced by signs of the immediate 
interpretant, through the first proper effect of a 
sign accounted for by the emotional interpret-
ant, to the inner or external action or act of 
imagination described by the emotional inter-
pretant, the latter two being sub-divisions of the 
dynamical interpretant. In other words, the au-
dience has increased in film literacy, and new 
signs and codes, meaningless at first, eventu-
ally become widely employed and recognised. 
The signs contained in the new code eventually 
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become conventionalised and are more easily 
decoded by a greater number of people. The 
variety of disturbances (cultural, semiotic, etc) 
in the external world are matched by the variety 
in the decision-making device and the system 
(entertainment) learns to predict from the feed-
back process and make compensating adjust-
ments. Fadiman (1972:81), for example, states 
that, "Should American audiences change ... 
Hollywood will promptly change as well". 
well". 
Communication, whether by film or any other 
means, is subject to the inexorable tendency for 
entropy to increase, for codes to become con-
ventionalised and for infonnation to leak or dis-
tort in transit unless certain extemal devices are 
programmed to control and monitor its transfer. 
The popular genres (including drama) perform 
this function. Their set of codes, conventions, 
narratives and images are extended by means 
of addition, selective emphasis and re-empha-
sis on a simple trial and error basis. But some-
times this self-adapting system is unable to 
match the changes occurring in the encompas-
sin@ system (sooety) and wnsequently be-
come redundant. One example is the horror 
movie. Universal Studio's elementary fonnula 
was sufficient for most of the 1930s: simple 
seek and destroy narratives featuring Dracula, 
Frankenstein, Werewolf or a Mummy. But after 
a while familiarity breeds contempt, infonnation 
becomes entropic and the disruption of homeo-
stasis is rapidly reflected in declining box office 
returns. The film maker consequently becomes 
subject to commercial and aesthetic pressures 
which demand the introduction of new infonna-
tion, new signs and new codes. The new infor-
mation, signs and codes are tested over a 
period of time and are either subsumed into the 
genre (measured in terms of probability) which 
.elevates itself to a higher level of order and 
purpose, or it is discarded and the genre re-
mains at a lower level of organization and a 
higher degree of probability and redundancy. 
Alternatively, notes Tudor (1974:170), some 
development occurs through the normal un-
guided process of evolution, a response to a 
combination of social pressure, belief, whim 
and personal preferences which leads to a con-
tinuous process of amendment, re-emphasis 
and alteration. Even then, unless the receiver 
has an interpreting structure (or set of interpre-
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tants) capable of decoding incoming informa-
tion, a loss of meaning or rejection may work 
against any action (mediated by the dynamical 
interpretant) on the part of the interpreter. That 
is, the interpreter must be able to make a dis-
tinction between information processed at the 
immediate interpretant level, that which is fed 
into the system (genre), and the information 
that is left once the narrative has worked itself 
out. This residual information (measured in 
hubits), when further filtered by the dynamical 
interpretant produces an effect on the interpre-
ter where the remaining infonnation can be ef-
fectively acted upon by the interpreter. Accord-
ing to Wiener (1954:93-94) it is not the quantitv 
of information sent that is important for action, 
but rather the quantity of information which can 
penetrate into a communication and storage 
apparatus sufficiently to serve as a trigger for 
action. To a pre-literate Bushman, for example, 
a genre film (eg., a Western) has little meaning, 
but for a person who has seen more than one 
Western, the genre becomes the ihterpreting 
structure (or interpretant) which measures the 
1evelof probability thatafjlm willhe understood_ 
Wiener (1954:94) calls this process the Cyber-
netics of semantics and offers the following 
example: 
When I hear a passage of music, the greater 
part of the sound gets to my sense organs 
and reaches my brain. However, if I lack the 
perception and training necessary for the 
aesthetic understanding for musical struc-
ture, the information will meet a block, 
whereas if I were a trained musician it would 
meet an interpreting structure (or a set of 
interpretants) which would exhibit the pat-
tern in a significant fonn which can lead to 
aesthetic appreciation and further under-
standing ... From the point of view of 
Cybernetics, semantics defines the extent of 
meaning and controls its loss in a communi-
cation system. 
Semantically significant infonnation is 
brought about by the triadic process where a 
sign is only a sign if its signifier is an interpre-
tant, where one thing is brought about for the 
sake of another. Semantically significant infor-
mation operates at the level of the dynamical 
interpretant, is negentropic, leads to growth, 
change and extension in a system. 
Established rules and semiotic components 
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,miotic components 
may be redefined, extended or even broken by 
introducing new interpretations of traditional 
characters. Sam Peckinpah's Westerns have 
utilised such techniques in The Wild Bunch 
(1969) and Ride the High Country (1962). If 
these films which explore new ideas, new signs 
and new codes meet with box-olfice success, 
then the new information introduced is semanti-
cally significant. The new signs and codes are 
less conventional and less constraining than 
those they have supplanted and the quality of 
impression is designed to produce both an 
emotional and an energetic effect in the inter-
preter. Where the new infomlation finds rapport 
with the interpreting structure or receiver (i.e. a 
set of interpretants) the message will be under-
stood and acted upon despite human and/or 
nature's attempt to subvert it in terms of the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics. 
This brings the discussion to the considera-
tion of the third component of Peirce's definition 
of the dynamical interpretant, the logical inter-
pretanl. This third kind of dynamical interpre-
tanl is a sign (or habit) which allows for future 
translations and for future development, 
whereas a feeling or activity do no!. Peirce 
, (5.476) divides the logical interpretant into two 
further sub-divisions, the non-ultimate and the 
ultimate: 
Shall we say this effect (the logical interpre-
tant) may be a thought, that is to say, a 
menial sign? No doubt, it may be so; only, if 
this sign be of an intellectual kind., as it 
would have to be - it must itself have a 
logical interpretant; so that it cannot be the 
ultimate logical interpretant of the concept. It 
can be proved thatthe only mental elfectthat 
can be so produced and that it is not a sign 
but is of a general application is a habit-
change ... 
An effect which is itself a sign is a non-Ulti-
mate effect, since it would itself require an in-
terpretant. The ultimate logical interpretant is a 
resting place which allows for the natural temli-
nation of the process of unlimited semiosis; it is 
not in itself a source for a further state of flux. 
Peirce asserts that a habit-change is the non-
ultimate logical interpretant and covers varia-
tions of any kind in a person's habits. A re-
sponse to a sign need not create a wholly new 
habit. A habit is a disposition to act or react in a 
certain manner under specific conditions. A 
habit is conditional, the exercise of a habit being 
conditioned by the presence of a proper stimu-
lus. If certain conditions are given, and if a result 
of a particular kind is desired, the habit func-
tions. Habits have to do with the activity of 
thought. This is linked up with what Peirce 
(5.481) calls mental experiments in which: "We 
imagine ourselves in various situations and ani-
mated by various motives; and we proceed to 
trace out the alternative lines of conduct which 
the conjectures would leave open to us". In 
other words, the habit governs the activities in 
the attainment of some goal or effect. It is the 
process of habit -change which accounts for 
films which disregard genre conventions alto-
gether and which create an audience response 
conducive to change and innovation. Such 
change is of an intellectual nature. It is based on 
conditionality, the 'would be' species of future 
tense of the logical interpretant. The non-ulti-
mate logical inlerpretant or habit-change is 
conditional upon the triadic process; it is the 
result of an act of enquiry and the interpretant 
produced is assumed to be a modification of 
consciousness. This notion of a habit is com-
parable to the cybernetic concept of control 
where change is brought about to attain desired 
goals under certain conditions. It will be re-
membered that a habit functions where condi-
tions are given and where a certain result is 
required. In films like Orson Welles' Citizen 
Kane (1941) and Jans Raulenbach's Jannie 
Totsiens (1970) self-transformation is facilita-
ted through the effect of the dynamical inter-
pretant, and in particular, its logical dimension. 
Films which are negentropic explore and en-
quire. They seek to cause a habit-change, par-
ticularly where intellectual concepts are con-
cerned. Enquiry through film (or video or drama 
or science, etc) must be through icons, indices 
and symbols. In addition, such films must be 
capable of bringing about the fOmlation of a 
habit. The habit created is the springboard to 
progress and change and provides the basis of 
another dimension of the semiotic process. 
It often happens, however, that the codes of 
film are in advance of the audience's propensity 
for a habit-change. In such instances, for ex-
ample, Stanley Kubrick's 2001: A Space Odys-
sey (1968), the film struggles at the box office 
on initial release, but is1ater declared a classic. 
That audiences have increased their film lite-
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racy in the interim is often evidenced by a 
identifiable lag between release and profitabi-
lity. Coupled with semantically significant infor-
mation, the result is an audience more able to 
accept change of the system. Such change is 
conditional upon the effect of the ultimate logi-
cal interpretant which causes a habit-change. 
The evolutionary kind of film operates at a 
higher value of equi-probability than the genre, 
and unlike the synchronic closed system of re-
lationships which characterizes the genre at a 
fixed point in time, evolutionary movies may be 
subjected to diachronic analysis which traces 
the development of a system through time. It 
emphasises the changes that elements of the 
system undergo. Film movements, for exam-
ple, demand change (or a habit-change) and 
are a direct challenge to the homeostatic 
genres which tend to operate only marginally 
further than the level fo the immediate inter-
pretant. 
Often, however, the reverse process can oc-
cur. The Soviet films of the 1920s, for example, 
unlike the cinema of the French New Wave or 
Italian neorealism which were predicated upon 
continuing change and open ended objectives, 
eventually lost their inner dynamic for change 
due to an extemal need for stability and the 
absoluteness of their objectives. The process 
of unlimited semiosis was constrained in terms 
of Soviet ideology and negentropy gave way to 
entropy as a regression backwards from the 
ultimate logical interpretant to the basic im-
mediate interpretant progressively restricted 
the hub it flow of content, which in turn narrowed 
the consciousness of Soviet society. 
Revolutionary Change: Beyond the Code 
The nature of art is defined by revolutionary 
change in which signs, codes, languages and 
relationships are transformed. Whereas the im-
mediate interpretant is really the sign itself, the 
dynamical interpretant is the actual effect pro-
duced and the third category of interpretant, the 
final interpretant, is that "which would finally be 
decided to be the true interpretation if consid-
eration of the matter were carried so far that an 
ultimate opinion were reached" (Peirce, 
8.184). It is the "effectthe sign would produce 
upon any mind upon which circumstances 
should permit it to work out its full effect." (Fitz-
gerald, 1966:79-80). The final interpretant is 
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is reached through the working of the dynami-
cal interpretant. According to Peirce (8.315), 
"the Dynamical Interpretant indefinitely ap-
proaches the character of the (Final Immediate) 
Interpretant". Peirce is not concemed with 
what does happen as a result of the sign, but 
rather with the sign as law and with what is 
destined because of the sign. This final inter-
pretant is concerned with an ideal, that which 
would be produced, the legisign. 
The freedom of art to break its own codes is 
rnade possible through the process of unlimited 
semiosis, the continuous production of inter-
pretants. Sometimes a new arfform or style ap-
pears meaningless when first produced. This 
occurs because some signs which are capable 
of producing an ultirnate logical interpretant do 
not do so because the interpreter may be un-
able to carry the semiotic process far enough to 
establish or change a habit. Code switching or 
extension occurs in conjunction with interpre-
tant production -and reaches its highest value of 
equi-probability in the final interpretant. This 
freedom of going beyond the code is discussed 
by Culler (1976:100-101) in the following terms: 
... aesthetic expression airns to communi-
cate notions, subtleties, complexities which 
have not yet been formulated, and therefore, 
as soon as an aesthetic code comes to be 
generally perceived as a code ... then works 
of art tend to move beyond this code. They 
question, parody, and generally undermine 
the code while exploring its possible muta-
tions and extensions. One might even say 
that much of the interest of works of art lies in 
the way in which they explore and modify the 
codes which they seem to be using; and this 
makes semiological investigation of these 
systems both highly relevant and extremely 
difficult. 
Here, the artist, a visionary, a catalyst of 
change, is always engaged in writing a detailed 
history of the future (that which would be, the 
legisign) because he is one of the few people 
aware of the nature of the present (i.e. the law 
which acts as a guiding principle). The artist 
often produces new signs, new codes and new 
structures in his attempt at diagnosiS, definition 
and rationale of the human condition. The ex-
tension of a code is possible because the highly 
motivated nature of the aesthetic sign imposes 
! 
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a necessary relationship between the signified 
and the signifier, where the signified is of a 
subjective, interior order of reality. At issue here 
is the difference between aesthetic signs and 
conventional signs. A cornmerical TV director, 
for example, is constrained by the conventional 
nature of the medium and its audience expecta-
tion. The paradigmatic and syntagmatic 
choices (codes) have been pre-established by 
the medium which exhibits a low value of equi-
probability, almost to the point of cliche. Televi-
sion relies heavily on the use of conventional 
signs which are low in information and domi-
nated by entropy. In contrast, aesthetic signs 
are less conventional, rich in information and 
consequently, negentropic. Such signs have 
recourse to the final interpretant through the 
immediate and dynamical and the choices 
available are determined by a high value equi-
probable system. Under these circumstances 
negentropy is at its highest, and the potential for 
change at its greatest. Or as Youngblood 
(1970:65) expresses it: "The notion of experi-
mental art ... is meaningless. All art is experi-
mental or it isn't art. Art is research." This 
dynamic conception of art may be compared 
with Peirce's notion of science as a living thing, 
a process of enquiry whose purpose is to de-
velop new habits, to work for progress and not 
merely to hold on to what has already been 
attained. habits and attitudes are important in 
the pursuit of the 'ultimate opinion. Since 
growth is attained through the acquisition of 
new habits (eg., methods of testing, film pro-
duction, critical perspectives), it is the framing 
and testing of new hypotheses which serve as 
the goal of enquiry ratner than the reworking of 
what has already been settled (as is the case 
with genre films). 
At this stage of the analysis it is necessary to 
examine in more detail Peirce's second tri-
chotomy of signs in relation to the cybernetic 
elements of film. The concepts of icon and in-
dex taken together are able to account for most 
of the content which is seen in homeostatic and 
evolutionary film, both features and documen-
taries. In revolutionary film, however, the ab-
stract, the non-realistic, the non-representa-
tional, both within narrative and outside it must 
be accounted for. Revolutionry art denies abso-
iutes and emphasises the relational reality de-
scribed by modern physics (Tomaselli, 1981b: 
5). While the images projected may be neither 
indexical nor iconic, they may nevertheless 
have clear relationships to both. Forms, 
colours, shapes, set designs and so on may 
acquire significance during the unfolding of the 
film which transport the viewer beyond the 
basic iconic/indexical interaction or narrative 
relevance. It is at this level that the third kind of 
sign, the symbol, dominates. According to 
Peirce (3.360), "Such signs are always ab-
stract and general, because habits are general 
rules to which the organism has become sub-
jected".ln other words, the symbol functions to 
bring generality to the sign process. Peirce 
(4.464) states: 
Every symbol is ens rationis, because it con-
sists in a habit, in a regularity; now every 
regularity consists in the future conditional 
occurrence of facts not themselves that 
regularity. 
That is, the facts that will be influenced are 
the images, the concepts and the action of the 
interpreter. Or, as Peirce (4.464) expresses it: 
The being of a symbol consists in the fact 
that something surely will be experienced if 
certain conditions be satisfied. Namely, it will 
influence the thought and conduct of the in-
terpreter. 
Peirce also defines the symbol as law, or regu-
larity of the indefinite future. The future condi-
tional effect of the symbol is explained by Fitz-
gerald (1966:63-64) as follows: 
The law, which is the primary meaning of the 
symbol, operates in such a way that upon the 
hearing or seeing of a token of the symbol, 
the interpreter will associate a mental icon 
with the objects which are denoted by the 
context in which the symbol is used. It is this 
habit of association which is the symbol ... 
The generality, then, lies neither with the 
Icon itself, nor in the token, but in the habit of 
association in the speaker or hearer. 
Symbolism in film occurs whenever an image 
or sound or both stand for more than and other 
than their immediate indexical referents or ref-
erences. 
Context is all important here, for different 
contexts constrain the production of interpre-
tants in terms of cultural and ideological para-
meters. The term, 'revolutionary', for example, 
means different things in different contexts. 
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Revolutionary Art: A Note on the Artist as 'Sub-
ject' 
Although my use of the term revolutionary does 
not exclude art designed to stimulate a revolu-
tionary consciousness in a political or social 
sense, in the present context the term applies 
mainly to what Neville Dubow (1982:6) calls the 
art of 'formal radicals'. This type of art is in-
herently revolutionary in terms of a new stance 
or attitude it proposes in terms of its own self-
reflexive references. The two ~ the social and 
the formal ~ are nevertheless interlinked be-
cause form cannot be separated from content, 
though the emphasis may differ. 
Revolutionary art, whether formal or social, 
has the potential of eliciting a response through 
to the final immediate interpretant, and beyond 
it. While both forms stimulate the process of 
unlimited semiosis, the nature of their signs and 
codes is largely different. Artists or film di-
rectors working in a revolutionary mode are not 
defined in terms of the subject matter of their 
work, but rather by the way they 'carry out their 
endeavours, or what Althusser calls 'social 
practices'. The formal radicals differ from the 
social revolutionaries in terms of the politico-
economic contexts of their practice (and work). 
Where the latter are forced to rely on explicit 
referential forms ~ some degree of realism 
which calls on conventional pictorial codes ~ 
the former are able to move into the abstract 
and the inner consciousness. Where the one 
deals with the relations of objective reality, the 
other is an expression of metaphysical space-
time relations beyond objective reality, though 
often consequent upon its imagined relation-
ships. 
It may be that the links between the two dis-
tinct practices could best be identified and ac-
counted for by means of the psychoanalytic 
problematic, particularly in terms of their differ-
ing ideological positions. Pertinent questions 
relate to the Lacanian! Althusserian postulates 
of the 'imaginary', the 'symbolic' and the role of 
artist/film make as 'subject', for it may be hypo-
thesised that where the social radicals seek to 
exploit the contradictions of social practice, the 
formal radicals have the ideological effect of 
closing off the contradictions through their 
search for unity. This unity, or totality, is often 
characterised by 'non-object' art where the ob-
ject and its subject are collapsed into each 
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other. The resulting symbolism describes a 
mode of relation of which the imaginary is an 
inflection. In other words, the symbolic is "an 
order that is intersected but not resumed by the 
ideological (ideology works over the symbolic 
on the subject for the imaginary" (Heath, 1976: 
255). The formal radical therefore, despite 
Dubow's (1982:8) conclusion to the contrary, is 
not immune to ideological pressure. It is impos-
sible to work in "socially appropriate terms be-
cause he feels that way" without being influ-
enced by ideology. Coward and Ellis (1977:77) 
explain the problem of the subject thus: "The 
imaginary identity of ideology ... puts the sub-
ject in the position of a homogeneous subject in 
,relation to meaning, a subject who thinks him! 
herself to be the point of origin of ideas and 
actions". The film maker or artist who takes the 
latter view remains unaware of the economic 
contexts of their social practice and imagine 
their work to be 'free' of ideological determina-
tions, that the language of the unconscious is 
the result of a discourse structure separate 
from economic structures, 
The point of this section on the 'subject' is to 
pointto the complexities that need to be taken 
into account in the search for appropriate con-
ceptual frameworks to account not only for the 
content of a film (or a work of art), but of the 
social practices and economic determinations 
which inform those practices. While this paper 
has primarily dealt with the former it has also 
intended to indicate directions for possible fu-
ture research and likely areas of theoretical 
connection. Previous research employing 
cybernetics has tended towards technological 
determinism and a theoretical base which ex-
cludes the contribution of materialist theories of 
language, the question of ideology and the role 
of the individual as subject This section is but 
an initial attempt to resolve these exclusivities. 
Concluding remarks: From description 
to prediction, 
G6ran Kindem (1979:65) has identified some 
unresolved semiotic problems which he lists in 
the following passage: 
Semiotics is a descriptive science, not a pre-
dlctlveone. It can describe the probable 
sources of meaning in general, but it cannot 
predict what meaning will be conveyed in a 
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De conveyed in a 
specific context by a specific sign for a 
specific individual. An understanding of the 
semiotic sources and possibilities of mean-
ing based upon a semiotic, typological ana-
lysis can be of value to both the film maker 
and the film viewer, critic and theorist. A 
more complex model would be required to 
predict the probable reaction of a specific 
audience to a specific sign at a specific time 
and place, since this would involve all the 
social science factors (economics, ideology, 
psychology, etc.) which must be considered 
in any predictive model or theory of meaning 
in human culture . 
A number of points arise out of this statement 
on the status of semiotics at the time of publica-
tion, and more recent advances. First, while 
semiotics was, for a long time, non-predictive, it 
is more than a purely descriptive science. As 
my article has shown, it is primarily explanatory 
in character, deductive and concerned with 
prediction. The way Peirce's theory is struc-
tured suggests that it has this capacity. Second, 
the more complex model that Kindem speaks of 
"to predict the probable reaction of a specific 
audience", has been outlined in the aforegoing 
pages. The marriage of semiotics and cyber-
netics as evidenced in this study will meet the 
basic needs of Kindem's "more complex model 
or theory". The third point relates to the ques-
tion of a theory of semiotic production. It would 
seem that such a theory would have its roots in 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, ideology and mate-
rially-based theories of discourse. 
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